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ABSTRACT 
The “political resource curse” hypothesis holds that countries rich in natural resources are 
less likely to democratize.  This research report seeks to determine whether such a curse has 
afflicted sub-Saharan Africa during the two decades since the end of the Cold War.  The 
possibility that abundant resources harm prospects for democratization is particularly 
worrying for Africa because the region is rich in minerals and oil and has had difficulty 
consolidating democratic institutions.  Moreover, the region’s resource dependence is 
unlikely to decline in the midst of the ongoing boom in international commodity markets.  To 
assess the “political resource curse” hypothesis, I use a combination of cross-national 
statistical analysis and nested case studies.  In the statistical analysis, I determine whether 
African countries rich in natural resources in 1990 have been any less likely to have 
democratized by 2009 – controlling for potentially confounding factors like prior regime 
type, economic development, and ethnic fractionalization.  I also use the statistical analysis to 
identify two resource-rich countries that experienced different political trajectories – Guinea 
and Zambia – and then present “nested” cases of trends in resource rents and political reform 
within them.  My central finding is that little evidence exists to support the “political resource 
curse” hypothesis.  Resource abundance is a poor statistical predictor of democratization: the 
negative association in the cross-national data is weak and statistically insignificant, and it 
disappears entirely if Africa’s five major oil-exporting countries are removed from the 
sample.  Meanwhile, the dynamics in the case studies do not reveal any consistent link 
between trends in resource rents and political reform.  If a “political resource curse” exists at 
all, it is most likely confined to major oil-exporting countries. 
 
